

Potential Influences of Climate Change on Maritime Legal and Naming Arrangements

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For millennia, human communities have used names and legal rules to make sense of the earth's surface and to demonstrate dominion over particular areas. These human practices have extended beyond the land surface of the earth to include the world's oceans and seas. Names have been given to off-shore bodies of water, both big and small, and elaborate agreements have been drawn up specifying the rights of governmental entities to control particular maritime areas and resources. However, maritime names and rules are sometimes contested. Since the outcome of those contests can have significant political, cultural, and economic implications, legal and naming practices have come to play an important role in international relations.

Given the stakes involved, studies of competing approaches to maritime naming and legal arrangements abound. Yet for all the focus in such studies on alternative historical practices and differential interpretations of rules, the physical environment is typically treated as a constant.¹⁰ This is not surprising given the lack of attention to environmental change in the laws and proceedings that govern the rights and obligations of states in the maritime arena. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Seas (United Nations 1982) makes no reference to the possibility of environmental change, and the subject has not arisen in recent United Nations Conferences on the Standardization of Geographical Names (United Nations 2007; 2002). These omissions reflect the fact that modern international laws and norms pertaining to the oceans emerged during a period of relative stasis in the geographical configuration of oceans, seas, and coastlines.

The past decade, however, has seen environmental changes that are having growing impacts on where, precisely, seas and coastlines are located. Moreover, scientific studies suggest that those impacts are likely to increase during the twenty-first century (IPCC 2007). Those concerned with maritime legal and naming practices can ill afford to ignore these developments, for they are likely to alter long-established arrangements and introduce new international relations challenges.

The goal of this paper is to encourage thinking about the potential significance of climate change for maritime legal and naming practices. The paper begins with an overview of the nature and likely impacts of climate change on the world's shorelines and islands and the types of maritime legal and naming practices that are likely to be affected by climate change. This is followed by an assessment of which parts of the globe are likely to face the greatest legal and naming challenges resulting from sea-level rise. Attention then turns to some of the geopolitical consequences that may follow from shifting legal and naming norms. The paper concludes with a few thoughts about how conflicts over these matters might be avoided, as well as the importance of deepening

¹⁰ There are a few exceptions, notably Freeston and Pethick 1994 and Caron 1990, 2008.

our understanding of this little studied, but important, subject.

The Potential Impacts of Climate Change

There is growing evidence that increasing concentrations of human-produced greenhouse gases are altering the atmosphere in ways that are affecting global climate. Currently, several studies indicate that the global average surface temperature increased 0.6 °C over the 20th century (IPCC 2001). During the same timeframe glaciers melted at an accelerating rate and the heat content of the oceans increased. Working together, these processes produced a rise in sea level during the twentieth century that averaged 1.7 ± 0.3 mm per year—and that figure hides an accelerating rate of sea-level rise on the order of 0.013 ± 0.006 mm per year (Church and White 2006). Moreover, most climate models show that these trends will be amplified during the coming decades. The models used in the 2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show, on average, a rise in sea levels during the twenty-first century on the order of 0.4 meters (IPCC 2007, 70), and many scientists view that figure as conservative (Pearce 2007). Indeed, the IPCC report estimate uses a rate of glacier melt that is lower than current measurements indicate—suggesting that the world may be facing a sea-level rise of a meter or more by 2100 (Caron 2008). Moreover, scenarios of sea-level rise on the order of 5 to 7 meters are predicted if the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets were to melt completely (IPCC 2008, 16).

Sea level rise will not be uniform throughout the world, but even using relatively conservative estimates, most coastlines will be altered by a warming climate—with significant implications for maritime legal and naming regimes. To begin with the legal side of the equation, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Seas gives states a territorial sea extending 12 nautical miles (n.m.) from their coastlines, a “contiguous zones” extending 24 n.m. from their coastlines, and an exclusive economic zones (EEZ) extending 200 n.m. from their coastlines (United Nations 1982).¹¹ Moreover, states have sovereign rights over their continental shelves up to 350 n.m. from their coastlines. State’s coastlines are calculated using a baseline principle that corresponds to the “low water mark” along a coast (Tanaka 2006).

Clearly, the low water mark will be affected by rising sea levels – opening up questions about long-established maritime arrangements. But the problem does not end there because what counts as a baseline will be altered as well. The rules on such matters date back many decades when an expansionist approach to establishing baselines was adopted in the 1930 Conference of States in The Hague (Caron 1990). The expansionist approach authorizes “the most insubstantial, sometimes ephemeral and transient, geographic features to serve as anchors for baselines, thus maximizing for each coastal state the reach of their oceanic zones into the ocean” (Caron 2008: 5–6). Under this approach, rocks that are barely above the water at low tide can be used to demarcate a state’s territorial sea and contiguous zone, and very low-lying fringing reefs and small islands that can sustain some kind of habitation can be used as baselines for

¹¹ A state has complete sovereignty over its territorial seas, and it may exercise the control necessary to enforce its laws on fiscal transactions, immigration and sanitation in the contiguous zone. States have the right to control resources in the EEZs, but other states have navigation rights in the portions of the EEZ that extend beyond the territorial sea (United Nations 1982).

determining the extent of a country's EEZ. The problem, of course, is that these sorts of features are particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise.

The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Seas does not set forth rules for changing oceanic boundaries if coasts change, but legal scholars have read the Convention to require such changes (Caron 2008, 11). We are thus facing the prospect of significant adjustments to the map of state control over the oceans as small, low-elevation islands and fringing reefs become submerged—changes that could complicate existing maritime disputes and raise new ones. Sea level rise could also alter the position of the “closing lines” that form the baseline when coasts are punctuated by sounds or bays. Under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Seas, the boundaries of a state's oceanic rights are not pulled in a landward direction if the openings to sounds or bays are not wider than 24 n.m. It follows that a rise in sea level that ended up widening the mouth of a sound or bay (by submerging a cape) could also have an impact on a state's seaward rights if that widening pushed the opening over the 24 n.m. threshold.

The challenges presented by rising sea levels are likely to be less on the naming side of the equation because the rules are not as precise or formalized. Nonetheless, some impacts can be expected. Most obviously, small islands and capes projecting into the seas will simply disappear—removing some names from the map. This has already happened to two uninhabited islands in the Pacific atoll state of Kiribati and to the island of Suparibhanga in the Bay of Bengal. In 2006 the first inhabited island vanished below the surface of the sea: the Indian island of Lohachara in the Bay of Bengal where the Brahmaputra and Ganges Rivers flow into the Bay (Lean 2006). This is likely only the beginning. Two-thirds of the near-by populated island of Ghoramara has been inundated, and the entire island is in danger of disappearing. The same fate may soon befall the Carteret Islands off Papua New Guinea (*ibid.*).

Naming challenges extend beyond disappearing chunks of land. The alteration of coastlines accompanying sea-level rise will require adjustments in naming practices. This has already occurred along the east coast of Greenland, where the melting of the island's ice sheet has revealed that what was once thought to be the tip of a peninsula is in fact an island (McCarthy 2007). (The island has already been given the name Warming Island (Or Uunartoq Qeqertoq in Inuit) by American explorer Dennis Schmitt, who has long studied the area.) Similar circumstances may well occur in other parts of Greenland or along the coasts of Antarctica. A different sort of naming issue will arise in cases where coastal areas become inundated by rising seas. Consider the case of the Nile Delta. A visualization produced by UNEP/GRID-Arendal shows how the Nile Delta would be altered if sea levels were to rise by 1 meter (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Expected changes in the Nile Delta brought about by sea-level rise (from Ward 2007)

As the figure shows, features such as Lake Idko and Lake Burolos would effectively disappear. At the same time, new bays and inlets would be created that mapmakers and others would likely want to name.

Areas of Principle Concern

Because some coastal areas are much lower lying than others and because sea-level rise will not be as great in some parts of the world as others, some coastal areas will face greater global-warming-induced sea-level rise than others. A sense of the overall geography of the issue can be gained by comparing a map of areas likely to be inundated by a 1-meter rise in sea level (Figure 2) and a map showing comparative sea-level changes over the past decade and a half (Figure 3).




Figure 2: Coastal areas subject to inundation in the event of a 1-meter rise in sea levels.
(Source: Center for Remote Sensing of Ice Sheets 2008)




Figure 3: sea level variation trends since 1992
Source: CLS/LEGOS, in AVISO 2008

Taken together, the figures suggest that the South Pacific and Southeast Asia are likely to face particular legal and naming challenges from rising sea levels. But some other regions will also be implicated: notably southeastern North America, eastern South America, and northwestern continental Europe, as well as parts of the northeastern Bay of Bengal, the Mediterranean, and parts of the Arctic (not shown on the sea-level trend map).

The foregoing list of regions strongly corresponds to the list of places where sea-level rise is widely considered to represent a significant public threat (Table 1).

Areas Where Sea-Level Rise is a Particular Concern

Arctic

- Yukon Delta (Alaska)
- Liberia (selected areas)

North America

- Louisiana/Mississippi River Delta
- Southern Florida

South America

- Amazon Delta (Brazil)
- Orinoco Delta (Venezuela)

Europe

- The Netherlands
- Northern Belgium
- Po Delta – Venetian Lagoon (Italy)

Rhône Delta (France)
Africa
Nile Delta (Egypt)
South Asia
Jaffna Peninsula (Sri Lanka)
Southern Bangladesh
Sundarbans (Bangladesh)
Southeast Asia
Mekong Delta
Most of the Merauke Regency of Papua Province, Indonesia
Oceania
Multiple small island states

Table 1

The patterns suggested by the maps and the table were anticipated more than a decade ago (see Freestone and Pithick 1994), and in some places long-established coastlines are already being altered. This is occurring with particular drama in the South Pacific, where sea level rise is threatening the very existence of countries. Tuvalu is a case in point—a state made up of nine atolls and coral islands, where the highest elevation is only 4 meters above sea level (Marks 2007). But other threatened states include Kiribati, Vanuatu, and the Marshall Islands (Marks 2006). The most critical immediate issue, of course, is the loss of habitable and arable land. But rising sea levels can also have significant implications for jurisdictional regimes and naming practices. As Muncel Chang (2000) points out, “Kiribati controls 1,370,300 square miles of ocean, an astounding 4,890 times its own land.” The continuing disappearance of some of the state’s 33 islands (two uninhabited islands have already disappeared) could shirk Kiribati’s EEZ by tens of thousands of miles, if not more, and could eliminate dozens of maritime and land names from the map.

Geopolitical Implications

The complex interactions between climate changes and maritime legal and naming regimes are altering geopolitical arrangements. Three cases are illustrative: the scramble for control of the Arctic, the stand-off in the South China Sea, and the rise of new alliances emerging out of shared climate-change concerns.

The Arctic

The Arctic emerged as an area of “co-operation and inclusion” (Heininen and Nicol 2007, 134) in the post-Cold War era—in part because it was seen as a region of limited economic or geostrategic value. But climate change is altering that calculus, leading to potentially momentous social, economic, and political shifts (ACIA 2004). Recent years have seen both the planting of a Russian flag on the North Pole’s seabed as part of the *Arktik-2007* polar expedition and a significant increase in Russia’s northern military presence. These developments reflect the fact that, as the ice melts in the north, major oil and gas reserves are becoming accessible (Hargreaves 2006) and a Northern Sea Route is opening up (Borgerson 2008).

Given the shifting value and importance of the Arctic in a warming world, some have predicted unavoidable “collisions of interests” between Norway and Russia over competing claims in the Barents Sea (Tsyganok 2008). The case should not be

overstated; state-controlled companies representing the two countries have agreed to work together to develop the Shtokman gas field. Moreover, exploiting Arctic resources will likely require Russia to enter into financial and technological partnerships with external entities (Zernova 2005). But Russia's interests in the Arctic are not just economic; they are cultural-historical as well. As explained by the leader of the 2007 flag-planting expedition, Artur Chilingarov:

Russia has always extended to the north. The Arctic is our native land, always was and will remain Russian. We planted the flag on the ocean's floor, where no other person has ever been. I don't give a damn what foreigners have to say (quoted in Rossiiskaia Gazeta 2007).

Chilingarov's statement suggests that Russia's northern focus is likely to intensify in the years to come, with implications for the approaches it takes to maritime legal and naming issues in the region. The *Arktik-2007* flag-planting episode is tied to a particular position Moscow is taking on the extent of Russia's continental shelf. It is indicative of a heightened concern with specifying and patrolling Russia's maritime rights in the Arctic and suggests that Russia is likely to continue to adopt an aggressive position on the location of its baselines and resist any attempt to pull them back if the Russian coastline recedes in the wake of sea-level rise. The near future may also see the promulgation of additional names for rocks, islands, and oceanic features in the Arctic, as this would be in keeping with the spirit of the *Arktik-2007* expedition.

The South China Sea

The South China Sea has long been an area of particular contestation among states over maritime rights. Controversy centers on the status of the Spratly Islands, which include some 100 low-lying reefs, islets and islands, and involves the states of China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam (Haller-Trost 1990). A certain degree of stability in the South China Sea was achieved in the mid-1980s as a result of an agreement brokered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations between China and ASEAN member states. And more recent agreements have raised further hope that conflict can be avoided.

Global-warming-induced sea-level rise, however, could alter the situation in significant ways. Most of the interested states seek to advance their position by maintaining some kind of presence on barely habitable reefs and islets. With sea-level rise, the ability to maintain this sort of presence will likely become increasingly difficult—leading to two possible outcomes: (1) the abandonment of some features or (2) the expansion of some features through artificial means. The former approach could fundamentally weaken claims rooted in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Seas, so this is likely to be seen as a last-resort alternative. Instead, states may well follow the example set by Japan in its efforts to keep the tiny “islands” of Okinotorishima from collapsing into the sea.

Okinotorishima is an atoll in the Pacific Ocean with two small areas rising less than 60 cm out of the sea at high tide. (The atoll is located some 1700 kilometers to the south of Tokyo and 1500 kilometers off the east coasts of Taiwan and the Philippines.) In an effort to make Okinotorishima able to sustain human habitation or economic life—the requirement that must be met for Japan to declare an EEZ around Okinotorishima under

the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Seas¹²—the Japanese government has spent billions of yen constructing a steel and concrete support system on the atoll (Yoshikawa 2005). The devotion of resources to build up Okinotorishima may set an example that will be followed in the South China Sea—a project that might preserve the territorial status quo in the face of rising sea levels, but would arguably be enormously wasteful of regional resources and have unfortunate ulterior environmental impacts.

New Alliances

While less directly related to maritime legal or naming regimes than the prior two examples, global-warming-induced sea level rise has created at least one new geopolitical alliance: the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). As the organization's website (AOSIS 2007) explains:

The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is a coalition of small island and low-lying coastal countries that share similar development challenges and concerns about the environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change. It functions primarily as an ad hoc lobby and negotiating voice for small island developing States (SIDS) within the United Nations system.

The alliance consists of 43 member states from all over the world that are pooling their efforts to lobby the United Nations and other national and international bodies on climate-change matters. More specifically, they are seeking to raise awareness of the threat that sea-level rise presents to their countries and working to promote policies that will both help curtail greenhouse gas emissions and facilitate adaptation efforts.

In the 1990s the AOSIS initiative was described as “one of the potentially most important developments in international environmental diplomacy of the decade” (Davis 1996). Although this claim is open to debate, it suggests that the AOSIS—and other novel alliances that might arise in the wake of a changing environment—could come to play a role in international discussions of maritime legal and naming issues. Traditionally such discussions have been dominated by states or long-established supranational bodies (e.g., the United Nations and the European Union). It is useful to recognize, however, that climate change could alter some of the building blocs of international relations, giving new actors a voice in the agreements—and the disputes—over the naming and control of the seas.

Conclusion

The time when studies of maritime legal and naming arrangements could treat the physical environment as a constant has come to an end. Sea-level rise is proving to be one of the most dramatic consequences of climate change, and resultant adjustments in the geographical configuration of coasts, islands, and seas will have inevitable implications for maritime legal and naming practices. Among the more serious consequences of this state of affairs is that seemingly settled arrangements could become unsettled, and new issues could emerge that would pit states against one another.

¹² At stake is an EEZ of over 400,000 km² around Okinotorishima.

There are no easy solutions to the destabilizing potentials that accompany climate change in the maritime arena, but early recognition of the problem can help. In some cases anticipatory agreements could be drawn up stabilizing existing maritime understandings (see Caron 2008). In other cases, agreements could be made that would obviate the need for states to engage in wasteful Okinotorishima-like initiatives. And awareness of some of the implications of sea-level rise could lead to interstate efforts to help stressed coastal populations and ecosystems—in the process fostering a culture of cooperation that could be of value as states confront differences over maritime legal and naming matters.

This paper is only an introduction to this issue, however. As our understandings of the particular physical geographic implications of sea-level rise become more sophisticated, it is important to bring those understandings into our studies of social, economic, cultural, and political matters. Maritime legal and naming arrangements provide an important example of how and why this must be done. Only very recently are highly detailed mapping initiatives providing insights into the coastal changes that will likely unfold as the seas continue to rise (e.g., the maps of the eastern seaboard of the United States being produced by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program). Such maps highlight the range of pressures that will be placed on legal and naming norms. They point to the need for more detailed, careful consideration of the impacts of a changing environment on the assumptions and practices that are at work in the global maritime arena.

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